Introduction
The goal of cooperative game theory is to study ways to promote and enforce cooperation among agents (also called players) willing to cooperate. A way to enforce cooperation is to find suitable allocations of the cost or benefit of such a cooperation among the players. These allocations must satisfy some rationality principles so that players are happy about their payoffs. Game theorists have analyzed the above problem over the years and have proposed several solutions, core allocations being the most universally accepted for the fairness properties they satisfy.
Basically, the core of a cooperative situation is the set of allocations of the total cost that satisfy the individual and collective rationality principles. In cost games, individual rationality means that no agent is going to be charged more than what he would pay acting by himself. Collective rationality ensures that no group of agents (also called coalitions) would be charged more than what they would pay when acting by themselves. The allocations satisfying those two principles can be considered stable in the sense that no agent or coalition would have incentives to break the grand coalition (the coalition consisting of all players), and thus cooperation is sustained.
There is a large body of literature dealing with core concepts in cooperative game theory, e.g., Owen (1995) .
Recall that a generic finite cooperative game is a pair (N, v) where N is the set of players and v is the characteristic function defined from 2 N to R, which satisfies v(∅) = 0, and assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a value (benefit or cost). For convenience, suppose that N = {u 1 , . . . , u k }. With this notation, and assuming v is a cost function, the core of (N, v) is the set C(N, v) = {x ∈ R k : x(S) ≤ v(S), ∀ S ⊂ N and x(N) = v(N)}, where x(S) = j:u j ∈S x j , for all S ⊆ N. In the last decades there has been an increasing interest in studying cost allocation problems arising from and related to a variety of operations research problems and general optimization models (see Borm et al. (2001) ). Pioneering studies along this extensive line of research are the papers on assignment games, Shapley and Shubik (1971) , linear production games, Owen (1975) , network flow games, Kalai and Zemel (1982) , and minimum spanning tree games, Claus and Kleitman (1973) , Bird (1976) , Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984) , and Megiddo (1978) . Even nowadays, this subject attracts a lot of interest among researchers, see e.g., the book by Nisan et al. (2007) and the recent paper by Caprara and Letchford (2010) . Our main interest is in cost allocation games related to location models. Some relevant references are Megiddo (1978) , Granot (1987) , Tamir (1992) , Puerto et al. (2001) , Pal and Tardos (2003) and Goemans and Skutella (2004) . The underlying optimization model of the games in this paper considers a connected undirected graph G = (V, E) with positive edge lengths {l e }, e ∈ E, where V = {v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v n }, and a set N ⊆ V \ {v 0 }. Each edge in E is assumed to be rectifiable. We refer to interior points on an edge by their distances (along the edge) from the two nodes of the edge. A(G) is the continuum set of points on the edges of G. For any pair of points x, y ∈ A(G), we let d(x, y) denote the length of a shortest path connecting x and y. We refer to A(G) as the metric space induced by G and the edge lengths.
Also given is a finite subset of nodes N ⊆ V \ {v 0 }. At times we refer to these nodes as existing facilities, or demand points. The distinguished node, v 0 , is viewed as an essential element in the system, e.g., each demand point must have access to v 0 . For motivation purposes, assume that the demand points represent patients, and v 0 is the location of a repairman or a medical doctor who provides assistance or health services, respectively. Suppose first that the cost of serving a coalition S ⊆ N is proportional to the length of the tour travelled by the server from his home base v 0 , visiting each member of the coalition and returning to v 0 . We then obtain the travelling salesman game, studied in Tamir (1989) and Kuipers (1991) .
In another situation v 0 can represent a central depot that all the existing communities must connect to. In this case the cost a coalition has to pay can be the length of a Steiner subtree connecting its members to v 0 . This model is discussed in Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984) , Megiddo (1978) and Tamir (1991) .
Our study is motivated by location models, where the time elapsed till the service is provided (response time) is critical. The cost function, also capturing the spreading of S and its distances from v 0 , that we study in this paper is the diameter of the set S ∪ {v 0 }. As an example of this situation, consider the case in which a set of cities want to install a system to communicate among themselves. The cost of the communication system is proportional to the largest distance between a pair of cities, including the information center v 0 .
We now formally define the two classes of cooperative cost games based on the above facility location problems, that we study in this paper. For any subgraph
i.e., the longest of the distances in the space A(G ′ ) between all pairs of nodes in V ′ :
Suppose that a coalition S ⊆ N, decides to use a subgraph of nodes in the selected subgraph G ′ . Thus, the cost can depend also on the distances between pairs of auxiliary transmission points. The two games we consider in this paper refer to the two scenarios mentioned above, respectively.
The first game, denoted by (N, v I ), is the minimum diameter location game (MDLG), where for each coalition S ⊆ N, the cost is the maximum distance between pairs of nodes of S ∪ {v 0 } in the selected subgraph G ′ . Since the additional nodes have no effect on the cost, in order to minimize its cost, the coalition will select
Thus, the characteristic function value is defined by the diameter
Note that the above setup, defined only on a metric space A(G), also captures the case where N ∪ {v 0 } are points in a general metric space X. To model such a general case, consider the complete undirected graph G * = (N ′ , E ′ ) with node set N ′ = N ∪ {v 0 }, and for each pair of nodes x, y ∈ N ′ set the length of the edge connecting them in G * to be equal to the distance between them in X.
The second minimum diameter situation introduced in this paper and denoted by (N, v * I ), is called the minimum Steiner subgraph diameter game (MSSDG). In this game the cost of a coalition S ⊆ N, is the maximum distance between all pairs of nodes in the selected subgraph
. The coalition will select the subgraph minimizing its cost. (Unlike the case of the first game, the best subgraph is not necessarily the entire graph G.) Formally, the characteristic function v * I is defined as follows:
For each subset S ⊆ N, define G(S) to be the set of all connected subgraphs of G
is called the set of Steiner subgraphs spanning S ∪ v 0 . Given a coalition S ⊆ N, we define its value, v * I , as the minimum diameter of a Steiner subgraph spanning S ∪ {v 0 }, i.e.,
is S-optimal then we can assume without loss of generality that G * (S) is induced by its node set V ′ , i.e., E ′ consists of all edges in G connecting pairs of nodes in V ′ only. In particular, if we let E(S ∪ {v 0 }) denote the set all edges of G connecting pairs of nodes in S ∪ {v 0 }, then, G v 0 (S) = (S ∪ {v 0 }, E(S ∪ {v 0 })), the subgraph induced by S and v 0 , is a subgraph of G * (S).
A game related to (N, v * I ) is studied in a companion paper, Puerto et al. (2010) . In that game, called the minimum radius location game, or the minimum Steiner subtree diameter game, the value of a coalition S is the minimum diameter over all Steiner subtrees spanning S ∪ {v 0 }.
We emphasize the difference between v I (S) and v * I (S). v I (S) is the longest of the distances in the space A(G) between all pairs of nodes in S ∪ {v 0 }, while v * I (S) is the longest of the distances in the space A(G * (S)) between all pairs of nodes of an S-optimal Steiner subgraph G * (S). In particular,
Also, if the edge lengths of G satisfy the triangle inequality then v I (S) = v * I (S), for any S ⊆ N.
In the next example we illustrate the difference between the two characteristic functions. Finding a minimum diameter spanning Steiner subgraph of a given subset of nodes seems to be an interesting combinatorial problem which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been discussed in the literature. (Note that unlike the minimum length spanning Steiner subgraph, the minimum diameter spanning subgraph is not necessarily a subtree.) We elaborate on the complexity of this problem in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
Our goal is to investigate the existence of core elements for the two games. In Section 2 we show that C(N, v I ) is always nonempty. Moreover, there is an extreme point of C(N, v I ), which has at most two nonnegative components (associated with a diametrical pair). We also prove that testing whether a given vector x is in C(N, v I ) is NP-hard. In Section 3 we study the game (N, v * I ). We show that its core C(N, v * I ) may be empty when the set of players is a proper subset of V \ {v 0 }. On the other hand, if the set of players is equal to V \ {v 0 }, then C(N, v I ) ⊆ C(N, v * I ). We also show that the problem of computing v * I (S) for a given subset of players is NP-hard to approximate within a multiplicative factor strictly smaller than 4/3, and v * I (S) can be efficiently approximated within a factor 2. Finally, we prove that for any coalition
, which in turn implies that any vector in C(N, v I ) is a 1/2-budget balanced allocation of the game C(N, v * I ). In Section 4, some results on the calculation of the nucleolus and the Shapley value are shown for the particular case of tree networks. We also present a compact formulation of the core in this case. The paper ends with some conclusions.
The Minimum Diameter Location Game, (N, v I )
This section is devoted to the MDLG. We first prove that C(N, v I ) is nonempty.
Theorem 2.1 Given a graph G = (V, E), and a subset N ⊆ V \ {v 0 }, let (N, v I ) be the respective minimum diameter location game, defined over A(G). Then, there is an extreme point of C(N, v I ), which has at most two positive components.
, and x ′ k = 0, for any k = i. It is easy to see that x ′ is in the core since for each coalition S such
Then,
Also,
A second extreme point of C(N, v I ), x ′′ , is similarly defined by setting,
, and x ′′ k = 0 for any k = i, j. This concludes the proof.
In spite of the facts that C(N, v I ) is nonempty and that v I (S) can efficiently be computed for any coalition S, we next show that testing membership in the core for a given vector x is NP-hard for general graphs. Note that the latter task amounts to testing whether min S⊆N 
Formally, given an MDLG with an underlying graph G = (V, E) with positive edge weights, and an allocation vector x, the core membership decision problem is to determine whether x is not in the core C(N, v I ).
Theorem 2.2 The core membership decision problem is NP-hard even when
is a complete graph, N = V \ {v 0 }, the edge lengths satisfy the triangle inequality, and x distributes the total cost v I (N) equally.
Proof. We formulate the independent set problem (Garey and Johnson (1979) ) as an instance of the core membership decision problem. An instance of the NPComplete independent set problem is an undirected graph G 1 = (V 1 , E 1 ) and an integer k, and the decision problem is whether G 1 has an independent set (i.e., a set of nodes such that no pair of them are adjacent) of size greater than k. Without loss of generality we may assume that |V 1 | is even and
2 ) be the complete graph with node set V 1 . Associate a positive length with each edge of E 2 as follows: If e ∈ E 1 then set the length of e to be equal to n. If e / ∈ E 1 then set the length of e to be equal to n/2. Let G 3 = (V 1 ∪ {v 0 }, E 3 ) be the graph obtained from G 2 by adding the node v 0 and the n edges connecting v 0 to the n nodes in V 1 . The length of each one of these n edges is set to be equal to n/2.
Note that G 3 is a complete graph with n + 1 nodes, and its edges satisfy the triangle inequality.
Next, set N = V 1 and consider the game (N, v I ), defined on A(G 3 ). In order to prove our claim, we will show that x = (1, . . . , 1) is not in C(N, v I ) if and only if the graph G 1 has an independent set of cardinality greater than n/2. We assume without loss of generality that E 1 is nonempty, and therefore v I (N) = n.
First note that v I (S) ∈ {n, n/2} for any S ⊆ N. Also, v I (N) = n = n j=1 x j . Suppose that G 1 has an independent set S with |S| > n/2. Then, by definition v I (S) = n/2 < |S| = v j ∈S x j = x(S), and therefore x / ∈ C(N, v I ).
Next suppose that there is a subset S ⊆ N such that v I (S) < x(S) = v j ∈S x j = |S| ≤ n. Therefore, v I (S) = n/2, and |S| > n/2. In particular, the subgraph induced by S has its diameter equal to n/2. By the definition of the edge lengths, S is an independent set of G 1 (otherwise there would exist a pair v i , v j ∈ S with d(v i , v j ) = n). Since |S| > n/2, the result is proven.
In view of the above result it is unlikely that there is a formulation of C(N, v I ) involving only a polynomial number of linear constraints. In Section 4 we present an efficient representation of C(N, v I ) for tree graphs.
The Minimum Steiner Subgraph Diameter Location Game, (N, v * I )
Unlike the game (N, v I ), we will show that the core of the game (N, v * I ) can be empty when N is a proper subset of V \ {v 0 }, and it is nonempty when N = V \ {v 0 }. In the latter case we call the game complete. Note that when the game is complete, v I (N) = v * I (N). This is summarized in the following result. 
Proof.
The result follows from the above proposition and Theorem 2.1, since C(N, v I ) ⊆ C(N, v * I ) in this case. The next result follows directly from Theorem 2.2 since the games (N, v I ) and (N, v * I ) are identical when the underlying graph is complete and its edges satisfy the triangle inequality. 
All edges are of unit length, see Figure 2 . ) If x was in the core it would have to satisfy, x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ≤ 2, x 1 + x 3 + x 4 ≤ 2, x 1 + x 2 + x 4 ≤ 2, and x 2 + x 3 + x 4 ≤ 2. Summing these inequalities yields 3(x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 ) ≤ 8, which is not possible when x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 = 3.
Also note that v I (N) = 2 < v * I (N).
In the above example the set of players N is a proper subset of V \ {v 0 }, and therefore it does not contradict Proposition 3.1 nor Theorem 3.1.
The results on the emptiness and nonemptiness of C(N, v * I ) have also been observed in some other combinatorial optimization games. For example, in the min-imum spanning tree game v(S) is the total length of a Steiner subtree spanning S ∪{v 0 }. The core of this game is nonempty if the set of players satisfies N = V \{v 0 }, Granot and Huberman (1981) , although it can be empty if N is a proper subset of Tamir (1991) . 
Computing v * I (S)
In this section we show several examples and observations on properties and approximability of v * I (S). The above example can be extended to show that adding to the graph a shortest path between a diametrical pair of G v 0 (S) can asymptotically increase the diameter by a factor of 1/2. 
Remark 3.2 As noted in the introduction, for any S there is a minimum diameter
(For each subgraph G * , and a pair of nodes v s , v t , we let
Also, note that even when the addition of a shortest path does not improve the diameter, it is still possible to improve it by adding some other path, as shown in the next example. 
We conclude that D * (G ′ (S)) is a 2-approximation of v * I (S), and
The following example shows that the factor 2 is asymptotically best possible for the approximation D * (G ′ (S)). 
Inapproximability of v *
I (S) Generally, the problem of computing v * I (S) for a given coalition is NP-hard, (Levin (2008) ). It is not known whether the approximation factor 2 is best possible, although to get a better approximation a different solution approach would be required. However, we have slightly modified the NP-hardness proof of Levin (Levin (2008) ) to show that even approximating within a constant factor α, α < 4/3, is already NPhard. Since Levin's proof is unpublished, for the sake of completeness, we include a proof of our modified inapproximability result.
Lemma 3.1 For any α < 4/3, approximating v * I (S) within a constant factor α, is NP-hard.
Proof. The reduction is from SAT.
Consider a SAT instance whose literals are w 1 , . . . , w n , and its clauses are C 1 , . . . , C m .
Let us denote the negation of w i by u i . Construct a graph whose node set is w 1 , ..., w n , u 1 , ..., u n , C 1 , ..., C m , t (i.e., one node for each literal or its negation, one node for each clause and one additional node for the true assignment). The set S is defined by S = {C 1 , ..., C m } and v 0 = t. It remains to define the edge lengths. Let 0 < ε ≤ 1/3. Each clause is connected to its literals via edges of length 1 − ε. The length of each edge connecting two literals is 1 + ε, if they correspond to different variables, and for every i = 1, . . . , n, the length of the edge(w i , u i ) is 2 + 2ε. The length of an edge between any two clauses is 2. The length of an edge between t and a clause node is 3. Finally, the length of an edge between t and w i or u i (for every i = 1, . . . , n) is 1 + ε.
In this graph there is a superset S ′ , S ⊆ S ′ , such that the subgraph induced by S ′ ∪ {v 0 } has diameter at most 2 if and only if the SAT formula can be satisfied.
First note that if there is a satisfying assignment then picking the true literals with S gives the correct S ′ with diameter at most 2.
It remains to consider the other direction. Assume that there is a superset S ′ such that the induced diameter is at most 2. Note that by the constraint 0 < ε ≤ 1/3, for every i = 1, . . . , n, S ′ may contain either w i or u i but not both, because the distance between these two nodes is greater than 2. (By the choice of ε this distance is equal to 2 + 2ε.) Assign a true value to the node that belongs to S ′ among the two nodes. Then, note that for every C j there is a literal whose node is in S ′ and therefore every clause has a true literal, so this assignment satisfies the SAT formula.
To observe that approximating within a constant factor α < 4/3 is NP-hard we note that in the above construction, if v * I (S) > 2 then v * I (S) = 2+2ε. Thus, choosing ε = 1/3 yields the result.
Tree networks
In this section we focus on the interesting case of tree graphs. Let T = (V, E) be a tree graph with V = {v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v n } and E = {e 1 , . . . , e n }. Let N ⊆ V \ {v 0 } be the set of players. It is easy to see that in this case the two games, (N, v I ) and (N, v * I ), coincide, i.e., v I (S) = v * I (S), for any S ⊆ N. We present an O(n 3 ) algorithm for calculating the Shapley value. In addition, we provide a compact representation of the core of the game, which has O(n 2 ) linear constraints.
First, it is shown in Tamir (1993) that the diameter function is submodular, i.e., for each pair of subsets S 1 ⊆ N, S 2 ⊆ N,
As a result we conclude that the minimum diameter game on a tree network is concave. (See Shapley (1971) for a characterization of the core of concave games.) Also, since the game is concave, its nucleolus (Kohlberg (1972) ) can be computed in polynomial time, (see Kuipers (1996) , and Faigle et al. (2001)), and membership in the core can be verified in polynomial time. Moreover, since the diameter game (N, v I ) is concave, it follows that its Shapley value is always an allocation in the core of the game. Recall that the Shapley value is the allocation φ = (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) given by
where s = |S|. Generally, assuming that the characteristic function is already known, it might take an exponential number of basic operations with respect to the number of players, to explicitly calculate φ by the above expression. In the rest of the section we show that, for diameter games defined on tree graphs, φ can be calculated in polynomial time.
First note that for each possible value of v I (S ∪ {v k }) − v I (S) there can be several combinations of coalitions S and players v k giving this value.
Consider some v k ∈ N, and a coalition S ⊆ N \ {v k }. In order to analyze the values that v I (S ∪ {v k }) − v I (S) can take on, we use the classical result of Handler (1973) . Given a subtree T ′ , to find a diametrical pair of nodes of
This pair can therefore be found in O(|V ′ |) time. This result implies the following property.
We now apply the lemma to the case where T ′ is the minimal subtree spanning S ∪ {v 0 , v k } and T " is the minimal subtree spanning S ∪ {v 0 }.
The following cases may arise:
•
In this case two subcases are possible:
and therefore v I (S ∪ {v k }) − v I (S) = 0. (We do not have to take this case into consideration in order to calculate the Shapley value.)
Note that the implications stated with respect to the above cases follow from Lemma 4.1, since if
given by the distance from v j to another point of S ∪ {v 0 }. Using the above properties, the following algorithm to calculate the Shapley value is proposed.
Algorithm: Computing the Shapley value
For each coalition S, the value v I (S) is a continuous function of the edge lengths of the tree. Therefore, the Shapley value is continuous in the edge lengths. Hence, by perturbing the edge lengths, if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that the distances between the nodes of the tree are distinct. (Specifically, if the edge set of the tree T is given by E = {e 1 , ..., e n }, then for each edge e j , we add the term ε j to its length l(e j ).)
The algorithm we propose calculates the possible marginal values (v I (S ∪ {v k }) − v I (S)) by finding the values of the diameters of subsets of nodes. These diameters are determined by all possible pairs of nodes in V .
In the first phase of the algorithm v I ({v i , v j }) is calculated for each pair of nodes v i , v j ∈ N, (v i and v j are not necessarily distinct.) The effort of this step is O(n 2 ).
In the second phase we consider all pairs of nodes in N.
• Consider first a pair of distinct nodes
Let T (i, j) be the maximal subtree with the diameter value equal to d(v i , v j ). It clearly takes O(n) time to calculate T (i, j). (Note that if x is the midpoint of the unique path connecting v i with v j , then the node set of
Let N(i, j) be the number of nodes in
If v k is a node in T (i, j), then for each coalition S ⊆ T (i, j), containing both v i and v j , we have
Thus, it is suffi-cient to consider only the case where v k / ∈ T (i, j). Note that in this case, by the maximality property of
Hence, in this case for each coalition S ⊂ T (i, j), v k ∈ S, containing both v i and v j , we have
• Next we consider the case where 
Consider now a subtree T (i, j), with i, j > 0. Then in this case, the number of times that the triplet {v i , v k , v j } and the pair {v i , v j } assume the marginal value
, for coalitions of size r + 2, r = 0, . . . , N(i, j) (r different nodes plus the two nodes v i , v j ) is
. Similarly, for a subtree T (i, 0) the number of times that the pair {v i , v k } and the singleton {v i } assume the marginal
Therefore, for each pair v i ∈ N and v j ∈ N ∪ {v 0 }, the coefficients that weight each marginal value in our approach are given by the formula:
Summarizing, the Shapley value of a given player v k ∈ N is:
For each pair {v i , v j }, C(i, j) can be calculated in O(n) time. Hence, for each k = 1, ..., n, φ k can be computed in O(n 2 ) time. Therefore, the complexity of the algorithm to compute the Shapley value is O(n 3 ).
Core representation
We have proved above that testing membership in the cores C(N, v I ) and C(N, v * I ) is NP-hard. Hence, it is very unlikely that these cores have compact representations for general graphs. We will next give a compact representation of the core of these games involving O(n 2 ) constraints, for tree graphs.
First we note that in this case, if N = {v 1 , ..., v n }, v I (N) is equal to the diameter of the tree T , (Handler (1973) ; Hassin and Tamir (1995) ) and can be found by solving the continuous (or absolute) 1-center problem on T , in O(n) time.
More generally, when N ⊆ V \ {v 0 }, then for each coalition S ⊆ N, v I (S) is defined as the diameter length of a minimal spanning tree of S ∪ {v 0 }. Such a tree, say T * (S), solves the continuous 1-center problem for the subset of nodes S ∪ {v 0 }.
Recall that the continuous 1-center problem for some subset V ′ ⊆ V , defines the smallest radius neighborhood in the metric space A(T ), which covers V ′ .
Moreover, T * (S) has the following property. There is an edge of T , say (v i , v j ), such that the 1-center of T * (S) is on this edge, and
for some nodes v p , v q ∈ S ∪ {v 0 }.
Clearly, the total number of centers of relevant minimum diameter spanning subtrees is O(n 2 ). In this case each pair of nodes, v p , v q ∈ N ∪ {v 0 } contributes one candidate, denoted by c p,q , the midpoint of the unique simple path connecting v p with v q . If d(v 0 , c p,q ) ≤ d(v p , v q )/2, the respective maximal coalition is then defined by
It is then clear that the core of this game is defined by the O(|N| 2 ) constraints given in the next lemma. The above polynomial representation of the core implies that membership in the core, can be tested in strongly polynomial time by the algorithm in Tardos (1986) .
Remark 4.1 When the tree network is a path, the minimum diameter game coincides with the minimum spanning tree game discussed in Megiddo (1978) . Hence, the efficient algorithms in Megiddo (1978) can be used to efficiently compute, both the nucleolus and the Shapley value.
Conclusions
To summarize, we have shown that C(N, v I ) is always nonempty. Also, C(N, v I ) ⊆ C(N, v * I ) when V = N ∪ {v 0 }. On the other hand, C(N, v * I ) can be empty if N is a proper subset of V \ {v 0 }. Generally, we have proved that for any coalition S, v I (S) ≤ v * I (S) ≤ 2v I (S), which in turn implies that any core allocation of C(N, v I ) is also a (1/2)-budget balanced allocation of the game (N, v * I ). We have also proved that recognizing whether a given vector x is in the core of the games (N, v I ) and (N, v * I ) is NP-hard. For tree graphs the games (N, v I ) and (N, v * I ) coincide and they are submodular. Also for the tree graph case, we have presented a compact formulation of the core, and given a polynomial algorithm to compute the Shapley value.
